Formulation of the Problem
In the transport, aviation, medicine, energy, military and in other spheres of technology and life especially important technological processes exist (Special Critical Technology Process or Operation -SCTP), which, if they go beyond the defined functionality, may cause accidents, often with severe consequences. That is why the hardware [1] and software [2] of the systems controlling SCTP (Safety Critical Systems − SCS) are subject of enhanced requirements for reliability and safety after failure. Special requirements are put also to the telecommunication systems, which must contain all necessary Safety related mechanisms [3, 4] . Most often they are achieved through structural, informational, functional, temporal or other forms of redundancy.
Depending on the consequences of their failures, according to [5] , SCS are divided into two groups.
The first group controls SCTP processes for which it is appropriate to define a criterion for fail-safe behavior after failure. According to this criterion upon occurrence of a failure the functionality of the system is restricted or the controlled process is stopped [6] . Through such undesired, but non-hazardous interruptions of SCTP, a compulsion for removal of the failure is created and the repairing of operability is accelerated so that the process could resume its course. That is why such failures are known as fail-safe. In order to have fail-safe behaviour, the systems are synthesized as per specific principles and technical solutions using redundancy.
The second group comprises such systems in which the fail-safe behaviour is inexpedient. In aerospace transport, aviation, life-support systems, etc., the nature of the controlled process is such that no criterion can be defined for fail-safe state or behaviour. Any interruption of the process is inadmissible. Such SCTP are subjected to requirements for high reliability, availability and continuity of the process that are achieved through fault-tolerance of their controlling systems. To that end various forms of reservation through redundancy are applied [7, 8] .
The applied fail-safe methods and devices most often lead to lowering reliability, which is expressed as more frequent interruptions of the process. Through additional hardware and/or software resource availability may be enhanced. When and to to what degree is this an efficient approach?
Subject of study in this paper are computer-based SCS with single reservation, which are subject of claims both for high reliability and inadmissibility of any incorrect controlling influences (safety). For the system to be simultaneously safe and fault-tolerant, approaches and principles are suggested, appertaining to both groups.
In [5] the subject of examination is a dual channel structure 2 ∨ 2 from the first group, in which the controlling signal, before its tranmission to the controlled object (CO), is validated via comparison of the results from the two channels. A guiding notion of this proposal is to reserve this structure with a similar 2 ∨ 2 system that is automatically switched on immediately after detecting any fault, without interrupting the control. In this manner a hybrid fail-safe/fault-tolerance FST-structure with high reliability and safety is created. Some specialized companies producing and/or using SCS, implement this approach, and yet, its scientific justification and the assessment of its efficiency in the available research literature are still in deficit.
The objective of this study is to propose a scheme and find probabilistic models of reliability and safety of computer based dual channel system and to establish the efficiency of the introduced redundancy in its various forms.
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Technical Solution
The system FST (figure 1) consists of two symmetrical halves, in which subsystems operate as per the scheme 2 ∨ 2. Normally, the main subsystem A is in control (microcomputers µC1 and µC2), to which the controlled object (CO) is connected. In operable state the output vectors of the microcomputers are correct and coincide. Comparator 1, which compares them, gives permission (OK), for instance, by providing its power supply. The controlled object accepts the controlling influence from one of the microcomputers, in the particular case, µC1. When it detects a fault through lack of coincidence, comparator 1 activates the switch SW. The latter disconnects CO from subsystem A, at the outputs of which, due to the fault, it is possible to observe incorrect output vector and switches on the reserve subsystem B (µC3 and µC4), which is operable and takes over the control. Thus, an incorrect and possibly dangerous influence on the process is prevented. The probability of switching off after fault is an indicator of the failsafe behavior of the 2 ∨ 2 structure and a safety measure. After its switching over, the commutator SW by another of its plugs places the OK permission in dependence on comparator 2, which secures the subsequent operation of the system. The object CO continues operating, but it is already controlled by B.
If both A and B prove inoperable, the system system fails safely, because no permission is submitted either by the first or by the second comparator.
When the main subsystem fails, but due to unrecognized incorrect output vectors no fault is identified, no switching to reservation can be executed. Same danger is created also when A fails safely, but B is unable to identify its failure.
FST system may operate in two modes, determined by its behaviour after the resumption of operability of the failed subsystem.
Asymmetric mode. When the failed subsystem A repairs its operability Comparator 1 automatically restores the SW switch to its initial state and the control of CO is again delivered to A. Subsystem B only performs the functions of a reserve during the failure of A.
Symmetric mode. The two systems A and B are of equal standing. After failure in one of them, the other is automatically switched on. But it remains in control of the object until its own failure, irrespective of the fact that most probably the alternative subsystem has restored its operability long before that and remains in hot reserve.
In order to operare in symmetrical mode, the scheme in figure 1 must be insignificantly modified.
Summary of What is Known from Literature Sources
Structures 2 ∨ 2 are known from research iterature and used in corporate practice as SCS systems [7, 8] . More rarely structures are applied, which are simultaneously fault-tolerant and fail-safe. Inasmuch they fall within the sphere of electronics, computer technology and telecommunications, upon analysis of their reliability the flow of failures and repairs in them is accepted as Poisson flow [9, 10] . It has the properties of stationarity, ordinarity and independence of subsequently occurring failures. The process arising under The dual channel computer subsystems 2 ∨ 2, which build the studied fault-tolerant structure (figure 1), are examined in [5, 9, 13] , etc. It is assumed that the post-failure vectors at the outputs of the two microcomputers µC1 and µC2 have even distribution. After occurrence of any failure by any reasons whatsoever, the vectors appear with equal probability, irrespective both of their sequential number and of their Hemin remoteness from the correct functional vector. Common-Mode Failure (CMF) [12] with intensity λ η is defined for both channels. Concurrent independent failures are also reviewed in both microcomputers with intensities of λ 1α and λ 2α (upon equally reliable microcomputers λ 1α = λ 2α = 0,5λ α ), which may cause incorrect, but accidentally, identical vectors. Comparison leaves these failures unidentified. It is clarified that the connection between the intensity of the common flow of failures λ 2ν2 = λ η + λ α from both types (α and η) and their causes is mediated by and depends on the input data, the content of the internal memory, the algorithms and the software of the microcomputers.
The models of the reliability and safety of the structure 2 ∨ 2, found under these prerequisites in [9] , are specified in the table, some of the quantities of which are clarified below. The probability of staying in the respective state is a measure of reliability, respectively of safety. The formulas for non-repairable systems are a function of the intensity λ of the respective type of failures and the workout t, and for repairable − in function of the availability coefficient
The causes (Fault and Error) of functional failure (Failure) of the structure 2 ∨ 2 may be in the two independent channels (α -Fault/Error) or in their common hardware or software components (η -Fault/Error). Here "independence" is used in the context of probability theory: the conditional probability of any of the events under the condition that the other one has occurred equals its unconditional probability. When the causes are in the components that are common for both channels, then they cause 100% dependent functional failures.
Two separate partial metrics are introduced regarding the fault independence:
• degree of independence of the irregularities of the hardware a f in the structure 2 ∨ 2, causing a flow with intensity λ f
• degree of independence of the errors εin the software, causing a flow with intensity λ ε By the parameters so introduced (ϕ and Δ) the independence is dimensioned of the two microcomputers and the depth of the diversity when the channels are different.
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In the established dependences (the table) for system 2 ∨ 2 the intensities are:
• λ α − intensity of failures detectable through comparison of the output results:
oλ αf − intensity of α-failures due to malfunctions; oλ αε − intensity of α-failures due to errors.
• λ η − intensity of failures undetectable through comparison of the output results:
λ ηf − intensity of η-failures due to common malfunctions; λ ηε − intensity of η-failures due to common errors.
• λ niC − intensity of failures in the common components of the system FST.
The forthcoming modeling and study is a continuation of what has already been published in research literature and uses the so introduced quantities and models.
Modeling Reliability and Safety

Substitution Scheme
The reviewed FST system has a substitution scheme (figure 2), which is brought down to reserving through substitution with hot reserve. In this structure there may be common for both channels (A and B) components C (switching devices, elements of the input-output arrangement, power supply, shared software, etc.). They generate failures, which cannot be tolerated through substitution because they cannot be identified via the adopted method and in addition, the elements from which they originate do not have any reserves.
The dual channel strutcure A (µC1 and µC2) is serial in terms of reliability since it fails upon a failure of any of the three elements α 1 , α 2 and h A , that build it. After a failure it is substituted by an identical structure B (µC3 and µC4) with the same functions and reliability. In order to switch on the reserve "layer" it is necessary for the one operating to "identify and recognize", that it has made a mistake (that there is a failure). This is achieved through the relative online test "is − is", which the respective comparator performs before validating the output vector.
If the comparator is included in the reliability analysis, two alternative faults of same should be borne in mind:
1. Maintaining OK, when it must interrupt due to a discrepancy -dangerous failure.
2. The OK interruption, when the output vectors are consistent and there is no ground to remove the permission -fail-safe.
The probability of dangerous failure of the comparator is neglected, since it is assumed that it is built following a fail-safe principle. All its failures are safe . Furthermore, it is also assumed that comparators and switching devices are highly reliable and in the quantitative analysis they may as well be reviewed not as an object of reliability. Upon such assumption the comparators are switched off by the substituion scheme in figure 2 .
The reliability of structure 2 ∨ 2 decreases as compared to that of the computer devices that build same. With the addition of the reserve "layer" the system becomes failsafe/fault-tolerance (FST) and its reliability increases. This system is a subject of reserach in this paper. The modelling that follows should answer the questions: is the additionally included resource efficient, i.e., how does it lead to enhancng reliability? What becomes with safety? How does software diversity influence the reliability of the structure?
Probability of the FST System to be Operable
In order to be operable the FST-system should not have any common failures, i.e., the component C in figure 2 should be operable. Under this condition the following states are operable:
• when A operates independently of the state of B;
• when A has failed safely, but B is operable. The substitition scheme in figure 2 shows that the operable state of the FST system has probability:
• P C − probability of lack of failures common for both subsystems A and B;
• P A , P B − probabiliy of operation of subsystem A (subsystem B);
• Q zA − probability of safe failure of subsystem A (with recognized failures).
If the reliability of both 2 ∨ 2 structures A and B is the same (4) P A = P B = P 2∨2 , then the probability P FST for operability of the system FST is for the system 2 ∨ 2 (here in the table), it is derived that the probability P FST for the FST structure to operate is
where v is the length of the vectors being compared, P η is the probability in each of the two subsystems A and B to occur common (CMF) failures, P α − the probability for any of the two subsystems to have failures independently of each other, P C − the probability for common failures in the FST system. When in (6) it is accounted that the distribution to failure is exponential
When the system is repairable 
Probability That the FST System Has Failed Safely
There is only one fail-safe state − when both 2 ∨ 2 subsystems have failed safely. The probability Q ZFST of this occurence is a reliability indicator of the FST system, and the decrease of this probability − a measure for improvement of reliability as a consequence of the effect by the second subsystem. The probability Q ZFST is determined as a result of a concurrence of two indepependent eventsdetected failure of A and detected failure of B where Q Z2 ∨ 2 is the probability of safe failure of any of the two subsystems. 
given the same meanings of the quantities as in (8) and the values of availability as per (9) .
Due to the negligibly low probability, no consideration is given to the case with the existence and concurrent activation of causes, which generate failures both in the common component C, and in the two independent 2 ∨ 2 subsystems A and B. If however, such case does occur, the operating subsystem will recognize these, because they are of the α-type. That is why probability Q C is not present in (11).
Probability Q niFST for Dangerous Failure of the FST System
With the probability Q niFST the FST-system has unidentified failures. They occur when:
1. Component C (figure 2) fails. Its failures are uncontrollable;
2. Component C is operable but: o subsystem A is unable to detect its failures; o upon detected failures in subsystem A and ac-information technologies and control tivated reserve, subsystem B does not identify its failures. Taking into consideration that events 1 and 2 are incompatible, the formalization given below follows:
where Q C -probability of failures common for the two subsystems A and B; P C -probability of lack of failures common for the two subsystems A and B; Q niA , Q niB -probability of unidentified failures in subsystem A (subsystem B); Q zA -probability that subsystem A has failed safely (with recognized failures).
If the reliability of structures A and B is the same, i.e., (4) is valid, then the probability P FST of dangerous failure of the system FST is (13) , where by index 2 ∨ 2 is designated any of the two subsystems.
When the distribution to failure is exponential (14) .
Model of Reliability in Symmetrical Mode
In view of reliability the two modes -asymmetrical and symmetrical -are equivalent until reaching a limit reliability state, i.e., during the time of exponential distribution of the failures while the model of reliability indicators is one and the same. For the even wear-and-tear of the subsystems a symmetrical mode is preferred.
Analysis of Type Modifications of the Studied Structure
Type Schemes of 2 ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ 2 Systems in Practice
Of interest are the models of 2 ∨ 2 systems 2H+1S (two hardware units with one software) and 1H+2S (one hardware and two software units) used in the actual practice by various companies producing SCSs for building fault-tolerant systems of the FST type. In these type cases some general failures may be disregarded as slightly probable and subject to the particular case it could be assumed that ϕ = 1 and Δ = 1 or Δ = 0. This makes more foreseeable and applicable the reliability and safety models developed hereinabove.
Fail-tolerant FST System Based on 2H+1S Structure
The structure is limited to one main subsystem 2H+1S, to be marked as A, and its identical reserve one, B, which is switched on after the first one fails. The two hardware units in A, in particular, microcomputers μ μ μ μ μC1 and μ μ μ μ μC2, operate as per one and the same programme. In subsystem B microcomputers μ μ μ μ μC3 and μ μ μ μ μC4 operate as per the same programme. We accept the denotation of the structure as (2H 1,2 +1S)+(2H 3,4 +1S). This structure underlies a computer generation of one group of corporate SCSs.
The errors in the only programme of the four microcomputers are multiplied and remain unidentified through comparison: Δ = 0. The models (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (14) and (16) are reduced as availability cofficients under (11) and change as follows:
In complex systems with voluminous software there could be negligible flows of failures generated by errors λ ε . That is why in these systems countermeasures are taken and it is relied mainly on: 
and control 1. Flawless programming, when λ ε = 0, K η = 1. In order to create conditions for this, the software is decomposed in foreseeable small programmes in type building μC -units (controllers), from which arbitrarily complex structure of the FST system can be built; 2. Complete independence of the hardware failures in the four μC from the two subsystems, i.e., ϕ = 1, accordingly on the computers in subsystems A and B;
3. Complete independence of the two subsystems A and B, when λ C = 0, K C = 1.
If the conditions are fulfilled, the probabilities for operability (8) , fail-safe (11) and unidentified failures (16) of the fault-tolerant FST system built based on 2H+1S, after substitution of (17) will appear as follows:
• for the probability to operate When conditions 1, 2 and 3 are not fulfilled, the calculations must be made according to the complete models (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) , (14) and (15).
Of more special interest is the reliability enhancement as an effect of the second reserve subsystem. Let's use the digit ξ -relation of the probability K Z 2∨2 for recognized failure in the 2 ∨ 2 system (the table) to the probability K Z FST as per (19) for recognized failure of the studied FST system. Upon fulfilled conditions, by substituting in this fraction after transformation, the obtained result is The digit ξ shows how many times it is less probable for the studied FST system to fail and switch off the control as compared to the probability of such occurrence in any of the two subsystems 2 ∨ 2, of which it consists. In other words − what the effect of Redundancy that has been introduced in this fault-tolerant system is.
As seen herein below, the enhancement ξ is by hundreds and thousands of times. The greater reliability of the FST system is attained thanks to the additionally introduced resource in the structure. But as a side adverse product appears insignificant increase of the probability of dangerous failure K ni FST . This is due to the possibility for the reserve system switching on after recognized failure, not to detect its failures. That is, a part of the safe failures of the 2 ∨ 2 system are tolerated whereby reliability grows, while another, though small, part remains unidentified and aggravate safety.
In order to assess this negative effect, a new comparison quantity ς is introduced, which is a relation of the probability K ni FST of unidentified failure in the FST system as per (20) to the probability K ni 2∨ 2 of unrecognized failure in 2 ∨ 2 (the table) The graphs show that with the decrease of the intensity of failures λ 2∨2 the probability of failures of the faulttolerant system may decrease more than 60 000 times. Analogical is also the dependence on the intensity of recovery after failure − the faster the recovery takes place, i.e., the greater μ is, the stronger the Redundancy effect will be. Influence on reliability, though insignificant, is exerted also by the length v of the compared vectors.
At the same time figure 6 shows that the probability of dangerous failures increases rather insignificantly and may reach a maximum of up to ς ≈ 3, which is negligibly low and occurs only given certain combinations of the parameters λ λ λ λ λ, μ μ μ μ μ, ν ν ν ν ν. At the same time safety standards [13] are measured in orders (for SIL4 and SIL 3 the difference is 10 times).
Fault-tolerant System Based on 1H+2S
In this FST-system n-version programming is also supposed. Various technical implementations are known. Two variants are reviewed here:
1H+4S. In one computer 4 independent versions operate. Programmes 1 and 2, which are processed sequentially on-line, form subsystem A. When an error is found in it, the system is switched to B with programmes 3 and 4, which tolerates the software errors of A. It is supposed that even if some errors may be present in B, given the same input parametres, they are not activated. The independence of the programme versions and the diversity of the software presuppose what is most favorable: Δ = 1.
If a malfunction of the only computer becomes a cause of discrepancy in the comparison of the two programmes, it should be identified. And yet, it may remain undetected if the programmes use the hardware in a manner that does activate the malfunction. Therefore, in the general case the malfunctions not detected through comparison may have a different share relative to all and ϕ = 0 ÷ 1. Structure 1H+4S incompletely averts the hardware malfunctions because the malfunction found by programmes 1 and 2 may be activated by programmes 3 and 4 and be identified again which means that the FST-system fails safely.
In order to obtain the reliability-safety models of 1H+4S, in (8) , (11) and (16) . In A two diversity programmes 1 and 2 operate. Subsystem B is a second computer, the same like A, with the same software. Since the two programmes are independent from each other, then Δ = 1. The errors found by one of the computers are not tolerated because after the switching over the other computer finds them as well and passes into fail-safe state. The hardware malfunctions in the two computers are detectable in general, but this is not always the case. The value of the parameter ϕ = 0 ÷ 1 depends on the manner of use of the hardware by the two programmes -the closer the desired unit is, the more differently the two software units use the hardware. "Differently" means that at least one of the programmes must activate a possible malfunction so that it could express itself as a false vector at the outputs. The expression of malfunctions may occur with a delay when the data change and the malfunction activates itself.
It can be summarized that in this structure the errors are detectable, but they are not masked. The detected malfunctions of the hardware are tolerated, but a part of them are not recognized. CMF are not detectable and therefore the two computers should not have any common components in the system, or if they have, there should not be any failures λ fC = 0 in them.
Under this condition the sought models are found as in the general formulas for the reliability and safety models (8) , (11) and (16) the availability coefficients are substituted as follows:
The availability K α is influenced by:
• the detectable errors in the software in the two versions generating a flow of failures with intensity λ ε ;
• ϕ -part of the malfunctions in the hardware features of the only computer in the 2∨2 subsystem, generating a flow of failures with intensity λ f .
When there are no other CMF-software reasons for failures the availability K η depends on (1 − ϕ)-part of the failures generated by the common hardware features in the 2∨2 subsystem.
The availability K C is influenced only by the flow of information technologies and control failures λ ε , generated by the unrecognizable through comparison CMF-errors of the two programmes. Under these conditions the increase ς of the probability of unidentified failures K ni FST may be deteremined as above by correlating the two probabilities -K ni FST Due to the complex expression the formula for ς is not cited explicitly herein.
As regards the other relative quantity ξ it is again taken into account that the probability of safe failure K z FST and the switching off of the FST-system is not influenced by the common unrecognizable failures. The decrease of this probability in times as compared to the unreserved system 2∨2 may be calculated analogically to (23) FST-systems of the type (1H A +2S A )+(1H B +2S A ) are implemented in SCS, more specifically in computer-based interlocking systems for railway traffic control. In our country they are known as corporate types JZSD770. In them two programme versions operate, identical in the two hardware "layers". Due to the software diversity the software errors are detected in time, as early as the off-line testing of the system. Nevertheless, the second version is permanently switched on and "circulates" continuously on-line. If there are any errors that have not been detected during the test, they are discovered in the first "layer." The second layer switches on, but since the same programmes operate there, the errors are again detected and the system switches off. This happens extremely rarely. Wherefore, it does not have a substantial influence on reliability. By removing the next successive error, the flow of failures decreases, for instance, following Jelinsky-Moranda model [14] . After detection of the last remaining error, a perfect software is achieved: λ ε = 0. It is assessed that it is not worthwhile to make four versions, the third and fourth of which in the second layer in order to detect on-line errors, which are "cleared" in time, after which no tolerating is needed.
This philosophy is embedded not only in the first FST-systems by Ericsson, but subsequently in the contemporary EBilock 950 that has found vast application in Europe and Asia.
Conclusion
A scheme of computer-based dual channel system FST is proposed with safe post-failure behaviour tolerating failures caused by reasons both in the software and in the hardware. By way of probability analysis reliability and safety models are found and the effect of the introduced redundancy is established in its various forms. The derived formulas are reduced and adapated for calculation of the reliability and safety of system structures used in the practice of developing Safety Critical Systems.
